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T WO challenges immediately must be . faced in any attempt to study ethical Editors' Note: structures. There is little contem-porary consensus as to what is the 
basic starting point or subject matter of ethics.This paper was presented at the 
The basic ethical approach used in this paper 
Central Division Meeting of the will be strongly pragmatic in tone. This will allow 
for the noting of a number of specific elements 
Society for the Study of Ethics in human and animal social structures which 
interrelate and interact in a rich variety of possi-
and Animals, held in Chicago, bilities. Ethical activity will be in evidence in the 
habitually virtuous workings of practical attempts
Illinois, April, 1989. to deal with and as best as possible solve the con-
stantly perplexing problems present in the 
dilemmas of everyday life and survival. 
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Various approaches are currently suggested as 
to how to undertake the study of structures. A 
rather fierce debate rages around the anthropo-
logical techniques of Claude Levi-Strauss. At 
times it seems that his methodology is so harsh 
and rigid in its delineation of universal structures 
of human behavior as to exclude the possibility 
of a pragmatic problematic in human affairs. But 
various clearly articulated strains in his work 
point to a much more open-ended view of the 
meldings and overlappings of the structures. 
They can be seen as a network of patterned 
activity in which parts and pieces within a single 
structure are exchanged and transformed in ways 
creative of highly ethical behavior. The workings 
of these patternings will in some sense be 
common to both human and animal behavior. 
One of the most constructive and yet contro-
versial ways of studying the patternings of both 
human and animal behavior is the sociobio-
logical methodology developed by Edward O. 
Wilson. His analysis is constantly concerned with 
ethical behavior. This will not be an ethic of 
abstract, lofty principles but rather a rough and 
ready ethic of involvement in the use of con-
stantly threatened and fragmented social struc-
tures as tools in the practical solution of 
problems of survival and development. 
Wilson's associate and popularizer David P. 
Barash maps out four modalities in sociobio-
logical study. I The first is basically descriptive. 
Here there is simply concern to identify the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the behavior of dif-
ferent animal and human social groupings. 
There is an effort made at simplicity in trying to 
identify only the most salient and important ele-
ments. Important to note would be communal 
behavior patterns distributed among various 
groups. Let me use one of the easiest human-
animal comparison groups to point out the 
workings of this sociobiological modality. 
Both humans and canines exhibit behavior 
patterns which show a deep tendency and drive 
to live in very close-knit family and extended 
family units. There is in both species also a hier-
archical structure within the group, with some 
members of the group having a higher, more 
powerful and more important status than others. 
This creates both strengths and ethical chal-
Between the species 212 
lenge. There is a rather constant need to rein-
force the social order of things. At times this can 
be a touching and warm show of affection and 
love. At other times attempts to disrupt the order 
of things can lead to violence and even to 
physical harm and in the most dire cases to 
death. Social groupings of both canines and 
humans display the Same traits. But these traits 
also cross the lines of both groups, as evidenced 
by our dogs regularly taking positions of sub-
mission to one or another (not everyone!) of us 
and by our affectionate petting of them. 
The second modality is evaluative. This is con-
cerned with the functional significance of 
behavior patterns. A few years ago I had the 
opportunity to present a paper on ethical themes 
in sociobiology to a meeting of the European 
Sociobiology Association. The meeting took 
place in a zoo at Arnhem, in the Netherlands, 
because the zoo has one of the largest chim-
panzee colonies under constant observation over 
a period of a number of years. Very clearly noted 
were a set of male dominance patterns. 
Especially important were the leadership displays 
of the chief males. They regularly made tours of 
the colony displaying certain attitudes of stance 
and deportment which demanded deference and 
subjection from the other chimpanzees. 
I live in a male religious community where this 
kind of behavior is constantly in evidence. Certain 
of the older members of the group have adapted a 
style of rather rigid ~d aloof walking and talking 
which demands deference and respect. Any chal-
lenge to this, just as in the case of the chim-
panzees, is met with stern rebuke. This is quite 
unconsciously done (a point I wish to return to 
later), so that if one were to try to point out the 
similarities to animal behavior, there would cer-
tainly be as much surprise as indignation. Yet 
much ethics remains hidden here. 
The correlational modality deals with the rela-
tionship between behavior patterns and environ-
mental parameters. We generally tend to think 
that animals are much more sensitive to their 
environments than humans. Yet in actual fact we 
both may much more share the same set of 
problems than not. There are situations where 
overconcentration of groupings of animals have 
not only depleted natural resources in an area 
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but have led to the debilitation or even 
extinction of animal species. Humans have at 
least the theoretical possibility of reversing this 
kind of trend. 
The predictive modality works off the central 
theorem of sociobiology. Because all conscious, 
surface, phenotypical social behavior has its 
origin and regulation in unconscious, depth, 
genotypical singular mechanisms, humans and 
animals will act to maximize their inclusive 
fitness. Any biologically, genetically programmed 
individual will act so as to propagate and 
promote in the best possible way the best interest 
of the proximate groupings within the species. 
This is the only way in which the individual can 
best survive and thrive. 
There seems to be a considerable amount of 
selfishness involved in such an approach, since 
the basic sociobiological mechanisms seem to 
center around personal survival at any price. 
This is really not so, since the practice of altruism 
is essential to this survival. It is impossible for an 
individual to survive unless the group survives, so 
there must be a contribution to the group in the 
hope and expectation of individual profit. 
Wilson terms this "soft-core altruism," since while 
there actually is concern for others, this concern 
is ultimately because of the advantages to self of 
such concern. 
Ethical questions here abound. While we 
might predicate this kind of selfish altruism of 
animal behavior, since we do not experience 
them as being unrestrictively kind and chari-
table, we wince at the consideration of human 
behavior as being fundamentally selfish. But 
moral and economic theories from Adam Smith 
to Ayn Rand point out that the pursuit of an 
enlightened self-interest is the best way to bring 
about the social good. What really is so wrong 
about being rewarded for good deeds? If we get 
no satisfaction we may not be acting ethically cor-
rectly. Human assimilation of animal traits may 
be of help. 
Altruistic behavior is displayed in four types of 
social involvement.2 Humans and animals tend to 
join or become associated with groups which will 
insure their best productivity. Sometimes acci-
dents of race, geography, health and age place 
individuals into certain groupings. Yet, as much 
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as possible we tty to control our placement and 
work in these groups. Important to note here is 
the role of what we might consider secondary 
groupings such as clubs or athletic organizations 
of one type of another. Actually there may be 
very strong bonds here as evidenced in the fierce 
arguments that all too frequently break out 
between sports fans of differing persuasions. 
Something deeply important to our surviving 
and thriving seems to be involved. Is it mere 
coincidence that we name so many of our sports 
teams after rather fierce animals? 
Two kinds of social groupings are directly 
related to our expectation of genetic repro-
ductive continuance. Our selection of a sexual or 
marriage partner initiates not only a bonding of 
one individual to another but the prospect of 
support or problems from a large number ofkin. 
Most of these situations provide as much chal-
lenge as consolation, but the opportunities must 
be made the best of in order to insure thriving. 
Parental manipulation of children presents in 
intense miniature the same set of problems. 
Psychoanalytic literature thrives on the conscious 
and unconscious problems presented by the pos-
sibilities here for good and ill. While these ques-
tions are clearly heightened in the human 
situation, because of the greater interplay 
between conscious and unconscious factors, 
valuable clues can be obtained from the study of 
animal kin and familial relationships. Especially 
important for our bifurcated American society 
would be the role of extended family groupings. 
Animal groupings display a good deal of 
reciprocity. Not only within a single species but 
clearly between and among species there is a sym-
biotic working relationship to enhance surviving 
and thriving. Involved here is a sort of sociobio-
logical Golden Rule, but the soft-core altruism of 
the rule is rather strongly at work. It is strongly to 
the advantage of one group or species to work 
constructively with another. The working rela-
tionship is often tenuous and tense, but the bal-
ances are maintained more than not. Patterns of 
human aggression and defense strongly parallel 
these animal configurations. Here the chances 
are very high that we have a good deal to learn 
from animals in that they seem to have worked 
out far better means of accommodation among 
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themselves than we have. There are few, if any, 
documented examples of animal genocide. We 
unconsciously long for peace and cooperation 
while consciously preparing for defensive and 
aggressive war. A more in-depth attunement to 
our animalistic survival tendencies might be 
some of the healthiest actions we can take to pre-
serve ourselves and our planet. 
Some of the most creative and suggestive study 
done on the assimilation of animal to human 
traits is in the massive work of the French struc-
turalist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. In 
order to understand this method of structuralism 
we need to consider the work of the pioneer lin-
guist Ferdinand de Saussure on which much of 
Levi-Strauss' structuralism is built. A great deal of 
any structuralist approach is based on linguistic 
considerations. Since language is basically a set 
of communication techniques, the similarities 
between human and animal communication can 
provide a linking clue into common ethical pat-
terns and behavior. 
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In his project of reformulating the tasks of lin-
guistic study Saussure makes two key distinctions. 
Language or langue is distinguished from parole 
or word.' Langue is the study of the basic struc-
tures of language. It is not so bound by the 
changes and transformations that languages 
experience over a period of time. This dis-
tinction is used as a foundation for the patterns 
of mythic structure in the work of Levi-Strauss. At 
a more surface or conscious level the workings of 
myth look more like parole, in that they seem to 
be ever changing and filled with complexities. At 
a more depth or unconscious level, however, the 
structures are more like langue, in that they 
remain constant over time and vary little or not 
at all from culture to culture. 
One of the most important of all elements of 
myth is certainly the use of animal figures. Myths 
of various cultures, from various times all over the 
world, have their sly foxes, wise owls, strong 
jaguars, wicked wolves and on and on. It is most 
important to note that the animals in the myths 
take on human characteristics and the humans 
animal characteristics. Certainly one of the things 
which is most strongly being suggested in such a 
move is the close interrelationship of the two 
groups in terms of behaviors. The myths are also 
deeply concerned with forms ofethical behavior. 
Perhaps what is happening is that one piece or 
aspect of human ethical behavior, such as sly and 
crafty behavior, is imposed on the more gener-
alized behavior patterns of an animal such as a 
fox. A piece of mythic parole is fitted into the 
larger langue pattern of behavior. The more 
unconscious aspects of animal fox-like behavior 
are assimilated to human behavior via the mech-
anism of a single behavior trait's transference. 
I should like to suggest that these single trans-
ferences across human and animal lines allow us 
to take on in an almost unconscious way a variety 
of animal traits. By and large we tell ourselves in 
these stoties that we would like to be like the 
animals we portray. There is a deep unconscious 
affinity which we would like to bring to the 
surface. So the study of myth will reveal to us a 
large number of situations of ethical similarity 
between human and animal behavior. 
A second distinction made by Saussure is 
between signification or signified and signal or 
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signifier" Together these constitute the linguistic 
sign. Unreflectively we think that a word directly 
and precisely denotes an object, but a little 
reflection will quickly show that this is not the 
case. If the word, tree, for instance denoted 
directly a tree which I might see in front of me, 
then I could not use this word to denote any 
other tree I might see. Rather, the sound (signal) 
which I make when I say tree refers to a concept 
(signification). When signal-sound and concept-
signification are working properly together, then 
proper reference of the word, tree, to the object 
can be made. But I can just as well use another 
sound-word, such as arbor or baum, to designate 
the same object. 
This shows that any single word-sign is really 
part of a larger langue situation. There is a great 
deal of unconscious linguistic activity going on in 
the production of any linguistic sign, thus 
making any such sign ultimately arbitrary. But 
this arbitrariness is in the context of the rich 
connotations that each term picks up in the 
history of the development and use of the lan-
guage. When we move from one sign to another, 
even within the same language, we carry a 
hidden residual piece of linguistic baggage which 
provides the foundation for the constant changes 
in language and vocabulary. Because there is so 
much unconscious linguistic slippage, we move 
and develop different patterns of language. 
The same thing occurs in mythic situations, 
where one or another element is assimilated to a 
different mythic factor via a process of rather 
unconscious manipulation and substitution. Levi-
Strauss has a rich and complex formula to 
explicate this kind of substitution.5 It is a most 
important formula because so much mythic sub-
stitution has to do with the exchange of human 
and animal characteristics. It reads as follows: 
Fx(a) : Fy(b) .::: Fx(b) : Fa-l (y) 
The symbol in the middle of the equation is an 
equivalence notation. The symbol <a-I> is the 
opposite to the symbol <a>. The capital F is just a 
function notation which will allow the interplay of 
the symbols <a> <a-I> and <b>, <x> and <y>. We 
can see that there is a rich substitutionary interplay 
among the various parts of the equation. The 
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symbol <x> works with <a> on one side of the 
equation, with <b> on the other. The symbol <y> is 
associated with <b> on one side, <a-I> on the 
other. Also the equation is structured in a chiasmic 
form, so that it could be written out in an X shape; 
the <b> factors and the <a> <a-I> factors would 
exchange places on either side of the equation. 
Let us say that <a> and <b> are human traits 
and <x> and <y> are animal traits. We would have 
a mechanism for explaining the move from one 
set of traits to another. Let us even suppose that 
one side of the equation is more conscious, the 
other more unconscious. Then the possibilities 
of substitution are rich and complex indeed. But 
it is important to note that at least one of the 
factors <a-I> is the opposite of another factor 
<a>. This is because in any mythic transformation 
there is a residual element which can never be 
wholly and precisely explicated. In the transfor-
mations involved in the mythic study of human 
and animal behavior there has to be an ulti-
mately inexplicable factor recalcitrant to full and 
clear explication. There are deep and rich simi-
larities between human and animal behavior, but 
they must be studied and explored in the mystic 
interplay between deeply felt experiences rooted 
and grounded in the collective unconscious of 
both animality and humanity. 
A rich and fruitful study of the unconsciously 
mythic character of human and animal expe-
rience can be done by working through the 
richness of the Jungian enterprise, and a large 
number of the somewhat disparate elements in, 
for instance, Symbols of Transformation could be 
fitted onto the Levi-Straussian chiasmatic 
scheme. Nonetheless, for the purposes of 
continuity in the Saussurian linguistic vein it 
might be useful to consider at least briefly the 
Freudian approach ofJacques Lacan. 
Any such approach will be much involved in 
the kind of parental manipulations modality of 
the practice of altruism already discussed in the 
material on sociobiology. Especially in the mech-
anisms of the Oedipus cycle we encounter the 
inability to clearly articulate our relationship to 
the closest of our social groupings, the family. 
Father figures play large roles here, in that they 
force a move into an order of clarity which is 
much resisted by the very structure of our uncon-
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scious. Lacan reads Freud in a very linguistic way; 
he thinks that the analysis of the language of his 
patients was the basic and only primary oper-
ation on which Freud concentrated the force of 
his psychoanalytic technique. Lacan builds a 
Saussurian component into the process. The 
crisis in the Oedipal cycle has to do with the 
correct connections to be made between signal-
signifIers and signified-signifIcations. This is 
expressed in a central formula: 6 
S' 
F S - =S (+) S 
S 
Another way of stating the same formula 
which puts it in more chiasmatic form is as 
follows: 
S' 
S' S s 
x 
S s S 
S 
In both versions of these formulae the capital 
S stands for the signal-signifiers and the small s 
for the signified-signifIcations. It is quite clear 
that the majority of the emphasis is on the latter. 
The reason for this is that Lacan holds that the 
unconscious is structured like a language, but it 
is a Saussurian language in which the emphasis is 
on the free play of linguistic signals. Our expe-
rience of language is conditioned by the free play 
of the unconscious, as this is dramatically con-
densed in the workings of the Oedipus complex. 
The actual points of precise clarity in our under-
standing of our place in the family configuration 
and the ability to thus neatly play out our 
assigned roles are few and far apart. Our early 
familiar experience grounds the attempts we 
make throughout our life to achieve clarity. This 
familial experience forms the foundation for any 
social groupings into which we enter during the 
rest of our lives. Ethics never occurs outside the 
context of a social group. The instabilities and 
unpredictabilities of social groups form the ques-
tions and challenges pointing to proper or 
improper ethical behavior. 
When we come to' try to recognize ethical simi-
larities between ourselves and animals, we have to 
realize that in some sense they also experience 
this kind of crisis of social and ethical identity. 
Almost all animal groupings as a result manifest 
rather rigidly hierarchical patterns of familial and 
social structure. Any interaction which we have 
with animals must take these structures into 
account. Careful attempts must be made to inte-
grate these structures into the kinds and patterns 
of structures to which we humans are accustomed. 
The difficulty is that our human patterns are 
governed in great part by the free play of our 
unconscious. We cannot be totally secure about 
our human social and ethical structures. The 
greatest promise and the greatest challenge of 
ethics resides in the opportunities and pitfalls of 
social interaction. Human ethical behavior in 
this context remains unpredictable and not 
subject to a neat scientific study or explanation. 
Rather, it operates more like a narrative or lan-
guage in which we have to go with the flow of 
events and affairs in order to reach some degree 
of fulfillmen t and satisfaction. 
We also perceive that animal behavior seems 
to be more or less socially successful and ethically 
appropriate. Anyone who lives with a dog knows 
that there are displays of accomplishment and 
displays of guilt. These behavior patterns are 
much involved with the proper or improper inte-
gration of animal behavior patterns into human 
behavior patterns. This occurs all through the 
preliminary oral and anal stages of proper 
feeding and housebreaking to the crucial 
parental-type Oedipal patterns of integration 
into the family unit. 
At both the human and the animal level these 
patterns are never completely controlled or 
understood. Rather, there is a perilous and grati-
fying interaction with considerable room for sur-
prise developments. It is the element of lack of 
predictability and control which furnishes the 
very stuff of ethics. Because of the unconscious 
mechanisms of unpredictability which underlie 
both human and animal behavior, we can never 
be sure what may occur in the interactions 
among ourselves, we develop social and ethical 
codes to have some order and structure in our 
relationships. Ethical behavior in both humans 
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the mannerisms derived from them. You have to 
E thics is not so much understood by study as by 
practice. It is rather like being 
proficient in a game or sport..... One 
of the reasons that animal wildlife 
presentations remain so popular on 
television is that a good deal of the 
behavior seems plainly playful fun. 
Yet, even the play of young offspring 
is play with a purpose! the learning of 
personal skills for survival and growth 
which will ensure the thriving of 
individual and species group. 
and animals is always a risky and chancy affair. 
This is why we never can discover or enforce any 
fmal and complete ethic which will be accepted 
and agreed upon by all. Rather, there is usually a 
very cautious approach to any ethical conclusion 
or consensus. Ethical behavior must remain an 
area of excitement and adventure. Since we find 
human ethics so problematic, puzzling, 
promising, and satisfying, we feel a need to want 
to explore the same areas in animal behavior. 
Our common and shared experiences should 
provide clues to greater clarity but will 
undoubtedly also lead into ever more mystery. 
We find ourselves in ethical matters playing 
more of a game than working out precise scien-
tific answers. A good deal of our relationship 
with animals carries a great deal of this games-
like atmosphere. It is certainly true of our 
dealings with pets, but is also the case in working 
with such domesticated animals as farm animals. 
It is vital to know their own needs and drives and 
FaU 1989 217 
play along with them. 
There is again a specifically linguistic way of 
understanding this dynamic. One of the most 
influential linguistic theorists of the first part of 
this century is Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his early 
work Wittgenstein stressed very much the logical 
precision of language. But he encountered 
severe difficulties in trying to understand how 
such a rigid language could refer to or picture 
reality. The work of his later period conceived 
language rather as a set of games.' Here there are 
rules but they are malleable. Even more impor-
tantly, the basic thing about a game is not so 
much the understanding of the rules but the 
playing of the game. 
Ethics is not so much understood by study as 
by practice. It is rather like being proficient in a 
game or sport. Animals seem to display to a great 
extent these playful characteristics. One of the 
reasons that animal wildlife presentations remain 
so popular on television is that a good deal of the 
behavior seems plainly playful fun. Yet, even the 
play of young offspring is play with a purpose, 
the learning of personal skills for survival and 
growth which will ensure the thriving of indi-
vidual and species group. The colorfully playful 
courtship displays so often cinematographically 
recorded for our entertainment have a pointed 
pragmatic purpose. 
Ethics itself remains pragmatically playful. 
Different approaches and solutions must be tried 
out in a variety of contexts and circumstances to 
attempt success. Like a game ethics is also never 
really finished. The excitement and fun is in the 
playing of the game, not in the conclusion. 
Hence, both human and animal ethical behavior 
are incomplete and unfinished. 
It seems not coincidental that a renewed 
interest in animal behavior and ethics is 
occurring when, at least in the areas of the social 
sciences, there is a re-examination of basic 
methodologies. This is sometimes termed a post-
modern approach. Jean Francois Lyotard, in his 
work on the postmodern condition, cites some dif-
ferences between the older scientific approach 
and current trends in the sociology ofknowledge.8 
First, in its older mode scientific language makes 
denotation central. There must be an attempt 
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made to delimit and delineate as precisely as pos-
sible the exact parameters of the matter under 
study. A postmodern approach (sometimes called 
a deconstructive approach) would be more inter-
ested in the narrative interactions between con-
ceptual and linguistic frames and the area of 
investigation or study. Rather than attempting to 
clearly define the ethical parameters of human 
and animal behavior, it is much more important 
to playfully, commonly explore the possibilities of 
interaction. This awakened realization of the 
wealth of shared human and animal possibilities 
probably underlies a good deal of the rising 
concern over what is perceived now to be an 
unethical use ofanimals in research projects. Such 
crass research settings for human and animal 
interaction force us back to viewing animals more 
as scientific objects of study than partners in a 
common social and ethical search. 
Second, in a context of hard scientific research 
there is a stress only on the role of the researcher. 
The subject is relegated to the status of being a 
mere object of investigation. Our social and 
ethical behavior is too closely related to that of 
animals to allow for such a separation. We are 
much more involved with the life and destiny of 
animals, and they with us, to allow either of us to 
objectify each other. While there is little evidence 
that animals so treat us as objects, in the rather 
few instances where we interpret their behavior as 
so motivated, we tend to hold them ethically 
responsible. The man-eating lion is somehow 
guilty. It is interesting to note that guilt is surmised 
in this situation because there is an unwarranted 
in trusion of the patterns of animal social behavior 
into the patterns of human social behavior. It is 
interesting to note that we might well consider the 
lion guilty but are, at least until recently, less con-
cerned to consider the hunter guilty when the 
death of the prey severely disrupted the pat-
ternings of lion social structure. 
Third, science as we have known it, claims to 
discover and establish truth once and for all. 
There is a stress on the role and function of rather 
absolute theorems and principles. Knowledge of 
the workings of these factors will provide a key to 
the absolute and unchanging patterns of reality. 
But advances in all areas of science, from physics 
to physiology and psychology, show that the real-
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ities studied are in aconstant process of change 
and development. Our theories must playfully 
mimic these processes. This also means that our 
theories and studies must have a past, present, and 
future. We have to be attuned to the personal and 
collective memories of ourselves and our species. 
We must also have some sort of project in mind 
for the future. 
In questions of human and animal behavior 
there is both the history of the respective 
groupings in each category as well as (at least 
from the human side) the present sense of need 
for a better rapport in the future. A basic start has 
been made by the very recognition that there are 
profound similarities between human and animal 
social behavior. This recognition immediately 
carries with it an ethical imperative that all social 
groupings manifest the playful possibilities and 
pitfalls which are the very stuff of ethical inquiry 
and striving. The more we recognize the ethical 
similarities between human and animal behavior, 
the more we will be able to foster and facilitate 
the playful gaming which has been going on 
between us from the earliest aeons of evolution. 
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